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I review prominent historical arguments against scientific realism to
indicate how they display a systematic overshooting in the conclusions
drawn from the historical evidence. The root of the overshooting can be
located in some critical, undue presuppositions regarding realism. I will
highlight these presuppositions in connection with both Laudan’s ‘Old
induction’ and Stanford’s New Induction, and then delineate a minimal
realist view that does without the problematic presuppositions.
1 Introduction
After decades of debate on ‘historical inductions’ against scientific realism
it is high time to reflect on the shape of the debate at large. Why does the
debate still linger on? I think part of the answer has to do with the fact
that the two sides keep approaching the epistemic issues at stake with quite
different ideas about what realism is. We can see this by reflecting on a broad
trend in the debate that displays a complex interaction between historical
evidence—‘testing’ of realism against the historical record of science—and
conceptual issues concerning realism itself.
The evolving dialectic of the realism debate involves an interesting inter-
play of (i) anti-realist attempts to use the history of science to undermine the
viability of particular conceptions of realism, and (ii) realist attempts to re-
spond by discharging realism of those specific conceptions by (re)conceiving
it to be less vulnerable to ‘historical inductions’. A broad look at the de-
bate reveals a trend worth reflecting upon: realist responses to historical
challenges indicate that anti-realists have persistently operated with an un-
necessarily demanding conception of realism in mind. Many realists have
criticized the historical challenges—from Laudan (1981) onwards—of unwar-
ranted pessimism that is due to an overly strong and demanding conception
of realism. In this paper I further support this criticism of historically driven
anti-realism by drawing attention to the possibility of further weakening the
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epistemological commitments that more recent anti-realists—Kyle Stanford,
in particular—have attributed to realism. That is, I draw attention to the
possibility of epistemic commitments that fall between the targets of (Old
and New) pessimistic inductions, on the one hand, and the sort of anti-
realism that those inductions are being used to buttress, on the other.
The key question at stake is: how strongly does the history of science
speak against realism? In answering this question it is natural to consider
the logical space of possible realist positions with an aim to identify those
positions that are compatible with the historical record. Indeed, the broad
shape of the debate suggests that this is a good way to approach the ques-
tion at stake. Historical inductions, Old and New, typically display the
drawing of conclusions of unambiguously anti-realist flavour from arguments
that actually only demonstrate a tension between the history of science and
realism-construed-in-a-particular-way. Given this, it is natural to ask how
much one should weaken one’s realist commitments in order to avoid the
force of these inductions? Instead of viewing the historical evidence that
anti-realists have amassed as speaking against realism in toto, we should
approach the question at stake more open mindedly regarding possible real-
ist commitments that fall between anti-realism and the sort of realism that
is in tension with the history of science.
My principal aim in this paper is to explore the space of possible con-
ceptions of realism that are reconcilable with the historical record. Towards
the end I will also delineate a particular ‘minimal realist’ attitude that is left
untouched by the historical anti-realist arguments, from Laudan and Stan-
ford alike. Here are a couple of caveats regarding the scope of this paper.
Firstly, I will bracket the various issues concerning positive arguments for
realism. Admittedly the full weight of the historical arguments cannot be
fully assessed without taking into consideration the (much) bigger picture
concerning the complete realist and anti-realist packages that involve other
considerations for and against particular conceptions of realism. Secondly,
throughout the paper I am primarily concerned with debates concerning the
status of ‘fundamental’ theories (e.g. fundamental physics), as it is in this
sphere of science that the historical evidence speaks loudest against realism.
Stanford’s anti-realist induction is also directly aimed at ‘fundamental the-
ories of nature’.1 I will argue that the coherence of a minimal conception
of realism shows that even with respect to fundamental theories a realist
attitude can be maintained in the face of the historical evidence. I believe
the realist furthermore has the wherewithal to defend less minimal realist
1Cf. Stanford (2006) on the scope of New induction:
The set of scientific beliefs [. . . ] most vulnerable to the challenge of un-
conceived alternatives will almost certainly include many or even all [funda-
mental theories] that form the very heart of our scientific conception of the
world. (p. 32)
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attitudes in other, less fundamental spheres of science, although I will not
defend this further claim here.
2 Historical inductions against realism
There is a long tradition of using the history of science to argue against
realist attitudes to science. Much of the contemporary debate traces back
to Laudan’s writings in the early 1980s (although the tradition goes back
at least to the early 19th c. ‘bankruptcy of science’ debate in France). In
his extraordinarily influential paper Laudan (1981) presents a forceful chal-
lenge to realism: the history of science is arguably inconsistent with certain
attempts to defend realism on the basis of the success of science and its
allegedly cumulative features.2 Historical pessimism about the reach of our
theoretical grasp has received a significant new twist more recently with
Stanford’s ‘New Induction’ from the history of science, challenging realism
about the fundamental sciences in particular. New Induction has not con-
vinced everyone, however, and the debate carries on unabated.
I will review these prominent historical arguments against realism so as
to indicate how they display a systematic overshooting in the conclusions
drawn from the historical evidence. The root of the overshooting can be
located in some critical, undue presuppositions regarding realism. I will
highlight these presuppositions first in connection with Laudan (1981), after
which I will reflect in a similar spirit on the ensuing debate, before moving
on to Stanford’s New Induction.
2.1 On Laudan’s ‘Confutation’
In the concluding paragraph of ‘A Confutation of Convergent Realism’
Laudan warns the reader of a possible misrepresentation of his position:
It is important to guard against a possible misinterpretation of this
essay. Nothing I have said here refutes the possibility in principle of
a realistic epistemology of science. To conclude as much would be to
fall prey to the same inferential prematurity with which many realists
have rejected in principle the possibility of explaining science in a non-
realist way. [. . . ] Given the present state of the art, it can only be
wish fulfilment that gives rise to the claim that realism, and realism
alone, explains why science works. (1981, p. 48)
It is striking that despite this explicit forewarning and the clarity of his
brief overall, Laudan’s has become one of the most widely misread and mis-
represented essays in the philosophy of science. The litany of references
to ‘Laudan’s pessimistic induction’, and misleading caricatures of it, give
2Laudan’s article is easily the most influential article ever written on historical chal-
lenges to realism. For example, its Google Scholar citation index is 720 (in October 2014).
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an entirely wrong impression of the intended thrust of Laudan’s argument.
This is not merely due to overlooking Laudan’s anti-inductivist inclinations.
The point of Laudan’s conclusion is not about inductive fallibility—about
the in-principle compossibility of past being one way, the future being an-
other. Laudan’s point is rather to emphasise the fact that the target of his
historical ‘confutation’ is primarily a certain set of positive arguments for
convergent realism. Laudan leaves completely open the possibility of coming
up with some other arguments for a suitable realist epistemology of science
that is compatible with the historical record, or there being a realist sense,
consistent with the history of science, in which our theories are systematic-
ally latching onto unobservable reality.3 The ensuing epistemological upshot
is naturally a cautious one (assuming the absence of an alternative defence
of realism), but Laudan’s conclusion is clearly not a matter of the history
of science speaking against realism in toto.
Laudan’s piece must be read and appreciated in relation to its historical
context: the statements and defences in the 1970s of the early versions of
‘explanationist’ realism, according to which the convergence of science to-
wards the truth is a necessary ingredient in making sense of science vis-à-vis
both its ‘otherwise miraculous’ success and some of its cumulative features.
The easy-to-appreciate intuition, popularised by Putnam and others, has it
that ‘the positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that
doesn’t make the success of science a miracle.’ (Putnam 1975, p 73). The
idea that ‘success of science’ could thus be linked to realist commitments
gained currency in the writings of Boyd, Putnam, Newton-Smith, and Ni-
iniluoto, for example, and Laudan’s paper should be read as a reaction to
the realist programme that tried to cash out this intuition in the context of
freshly ‘naturalised’ philosophy of science.4
Against the backdrop of the concurrent realist programme, Laudan’s art-
icle is an undeniable tour de force, and the line of thought still has some bite
against (some aspects of) the ‘naturalistic’ No-Miracles argument (cf. Saatsi
2012). But in the grand scheme of things its focus is much narrower than
is often recognised, and in as far as realists are capable of reinventing their
positive case for realism, they may avoid the brunt of the historical ‘induc-
3Cf. Laudan (1981):
I must stress again that I am not denying that there may be a connection
between approximate truth and predictive success. I am only observing that
until the realists show us what that connection is, they should be more
reticent than they are about claiming that realism can explain the success
of science. (p. 32, my emphasis)
4Putnam (1978) explains, for example, that
‘As [the realists] see it ... the notions of “truth” and “reference” have a
causal explanatory role in epistemology’ (p. 21. Quoted in Laudan, 1981,
p. 22).
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tion’ as Laudan presented it. The reason has to do with Laudan’s construal
of ‘success’ and ‘realism’: by the current lights this is arguably unmotivated
and overly demanding. In the current context Laudan can be criticized of
demanding too much from the realist, and of failing to consider the possib-
ility of more minimal ways of construing realist interpretations of science.
In particular, in the current context it is relatively easy to point to some
critical ambiguities and unwarranted presuppositions in Laudan’s argument,
with respect to central issues such as the following:
(a) What does success of science amount to (for the realist)?
(b) In what sense do theories latch onto reality (according to the realist)?
(c) What kind of knowledge do we have of the unobservable reality?
Laudan needs to make certain presuppositions in these regards in order
to tackle ‘the central question before us[:] whether the realist’s assertions
about the interrelations between truth, reference and success are sound.’
(ibid, p. 22) The realist assertions, in the specific form considered by Laudan,
have been subsequently overshadowed by more minimal realist claims that
no longer capitalise on the notions of reference and truth in the same way.
Let’s focus on the notion success, first of all. The nature of ‘success’
is, as Laudan put it, ‘the first and toughest nut to crack.’ (ibid, p. 23) It
is tough because Laudan finds little explicit guidance from the realists to
the nature of ‘success’. According to his (probably fair) interpretation of
the early realist’s gambit, the realist ‘wants to explain [. . . ] why science in
general has worked so well.’ (ibid: 23) With this broad understanding of
‘success’ in mind, Laudan then moves on to ‘assume that a theory is ‘suc-
cessful’ so long as it has worked well, i.e., so long as it has functioned in
a variety of explanatory contexts, has led to confirmed predictions and has
been of broad explanatory scope.’ (ibid, p. 23, my emphasis) The emphasis
of explanatory success becomes increasingly prominent in Laudan’s article,
culminating in his infamous list of prominent false theories that were con-
sidered explanatorily successful by the scientists: the crystalline spheres of
astronomy; the humoral theory of medicine; the effluvial theory of static
electricity; ‘catastrophist’ geology; the phlogiston theory of chemistry; the
vital force theories of physiology; the theory of circular inertia, and such. It
is on the basis of such ‘explanatorily successful’ theories that Laudan con-
cludes that ‘what the history of science offers us is a plethora of theories
which were both successful and [...] non-referential regarding [...] central
explanatory concepts.’ (ibid, p. 33, my emphasis)
What is so special about explanatory success? Why not fixate on (a cer-
tain kind) of predictive success instead, as the driver of realist commitments?
Shifting the focus from explanatory to predictive success can furthermore
deal with the problem of non-referential central terms, in as far as the very
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centrality of those terms is primarily due to their explanatory function. From
the contemporary perspective, one fails to be convinced by the contention
that realism in toto is challenged by past false theories that were (viewed to
be) explanatorily successful. For even if realism that emphasises ‘explanat-
ory success’ can be thus challenged, surely we can conceive of realism in less
demanding, more minimal terms by focusing on predictive success instead.5
This is, of course, just what many realists—since Musgrave (1985) at
least—have effectively said in response to Laudan (as I will presently recall).
I have laboured on the point here since Laudan’s emphasis on explanatory
success is yet to be properly recognised in the literature.6
2.2 On the debate on ‘pessimistic induction’
Many arguments in the ensuing debate on Laudan’s ‘historical induction’
exemplify the following developments on the opposing sides of the debate.
On the realist side many have argued that the impact of the historical re-
cord can be significantly lessened by (a) reducing the number of problematic
cases by strengthening the criteria required for realist commitments, and (b)
weakening the commitment that those more stringent criteria should elicit.
The more stringent criteria involve some suitably impressive kind of em-
pirical success that is not exhibited by the bulk of Laudan’s examples. To
this end, realists have evoked theoretical maturity, and novel predictions,
in particular. The weakening of realist commitments, furthermore, involves
some kind of highly qualified partial veridicality of successful theories, mak-
ing conceptual room for different senses in which a theory that is clearly
false on the whole can still latch onto unobservable reality in a way that sat-
isfies some critical realist intuitions (such as those fuelling the no-miracles
intuition, in particular). The anti-realist side, on the other hand, has been
reinforcing the historical challenge by more scrupulous gathering of histor-
ical evidence in effort to show that some particular historical cases, at least,
speak against any reasonable construal of scientific realism.
While these developments have pushed the debate forward, it is worth
noting how the ambiguities regarding the key notions of ‘success’ and (what
I call) ‘partial veridicality’ have persisted in the literature. To begin with,
while there has been a slow convergence towards emphasising predictive
5In the context in which Laudan was writing it is easy to understand why he construed
‘empirical success’ and ‘realism’ as he did, since the realist writings lacked clarity in these
key respects. Perhaps Laudan’s presuppositions are pertinent and justified in the context
in which he operated. But realism has evolved since then; the context has changed. It
is, of course, somewhat ahistorical to criticise Laudan’s argument independently of the
details of the views he explicitly opposed to, but by now those details seem to have been
since forgotten by many, both realists and anti-realists alike.
6For just one recent example, Wray (2013) notes the distinction between predictive and
explanatory success and discusses it in a parenthetical way, but he does not acknowledge
the importance of this distinction for Laudan’s argument and the dialectic on the whole.
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over explanatory success on the realist side (e.g. Leplin 2004, Psillos 1999),
this transition has been very gradual and incomplete. Some realists who
have later come to emphasise predictive success were also making references
to explanatory success in a similar spirit not that long ago. For instance,
while later Leplin (2004) only argues that ‘a theory’s predictive success can
warrant belief in the unobservable entities it postulates’, the earlier Leplin
(1997) mixes this idea with the notion explanatory success of theories in
the Novel Defence of Scientific Realism, where he eplicitly argues that ‘the
explanation of the theory’s explanatory success must be that the theor-
etical mechanisms it deploys are what actually produces the result.’ (1997,
p. 64) Similarly, Psillos’s (1994) early statement and defence of the divide-et-
impera move, first made in connection with his case-study of the caloric, sits
very much on the fence between predictive and explanatory success.7 Fur-
thermore, many realist commentators still take realist commitments to be
elicited precisely by explanatory success, in a way that tallies with Laudan’s
argument. (Prominent realists who have carried on arguing in this vein
include McMullin (1984, 1996) and Sankey (2008), for example.)8
All in all, a significant degree of ambiguity has persisted in the literat-
ure regarding the kind of success associated with realism, even amongst the
realists themselves. In the face of this ambiguity it is unsurprising that anti-
realists have not felt a need to operate with a demanding notion of success
when unearthing and using history of science to challenge the realist (despite
the fact that some realists have clearly tightened their criteria for ‘empirical
success’). Consider, for instance, the critical reaction in Chang (2003) and
Stanford (2003) against Psillos’s (1994, 1999) ‘preservative realist’ reading
of the caloric theory of heat. This criticism largely hinges on an explanatory
construal of ‘success’, and as a result the two sides are effectively talking
7See Psillos (1994):
Generally, not all deep-structural claims of a theory play the same role in
the derivation of predictions and in providing well-founded explanations of
observable phenomena. Some theoretical claims may be used centrally in the
derivations of predictions and explanations of the phenomena, some others
may be ‘idle’. (p. 181)
By comparison, Psillos (1996) is already much less ambiguous.
8See e.g. Sankey (2008):
I seek to extend the argument of McMullin (1987) that we are warranted
in taking a theory to be ‘approximately true’ if it exhibits ‘a high degree of
explanatory success’ (1987, 59). McMullin takes the explanatory success of
a theory to be determined by how well it satisfies the various methodological
criteria of theory appraisal (1987, 54). Where a theory exhibits a high degree
of explanatory success, as indicated by satisfaction of the criteria, there are
good grounds to take the general kinds of entities postulated by the theory
to really exist, as well as what the theory says about such entities to be
broadly correct, though open to further development (1987, 59-60). (p. 106)
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past each other. In Psillos (1999) the focus is on novel predictive success
and those parts of the theory that are both (i) responsible for such predictive
success, and (ii) arguably preserved in otherwise radical theory change. The
two critics, by contrast, focus on parts of the theory that were both (i) re-
sponsible for the theory’s explanatory success, and (ii) clearly not preserved,
with the intended upshot that a closer reading of the history refutes Psillos’s
realist gambit.9
It is one thing to say that such criticism grounded in the explanatory
‘success’ of past theories is unsurprising and understandable in the light of
the persisting ambiguities; it is another thing entirely to maintain that such
criticism should be taken to support ‘a simple but compelling challenge to
scientific realism’ (Stanford 2003, p. 924). For whether or not realism in toto
stands challenged by the non-preservation of critical explanatory aspects of
theories depends on what realism amounts to. Clearly the historical evidence
presented does not speak against realism in toto in as far as there is room
for realism that is more minimal than that based on the presuppositions
made by Stanford and Chang.
As I have discussed so far, one of the critical presuppositions concerns
the notion of ‘success’: there is clearly room for a more minimal realist po-
sition in that regard, leaving behind the preoccupation with ‘explanatory
success’ and committing more selectively only on those aspects of a theory
that are responsible for novel predictive success. (Indeed, Psillos (1999), for
example, already occupies such a position.) Another critical presupposition
concerns the scope of realist commitments, viz. specifying the realist’s epi-
stemic attitude towards a given a piece of science that is successful in the
commitment-eliciting way. Again, there is room for a more minimal realist
position than the critics of preservative realism have in mind. For example,
one of Stanford’s central misgivings about preservative realism is that its
commitments are not specified in a way that is prospectively applicable: to
convince Stanford, preservative realism should offer a recipe that can be reli-
ably applied ‘prospectively—in advance of future developments—to identify
the idle features or components of scientific theories.’ (2003, p. 915) Many
realists, myself included, have viewed as unjustifiably strict this demand
that realist commitments should be thus prospectively specifiable. Take
Newton’s gravitational theory, for example, and the realist claim that its
predictive success is (probably) due to the theory latching onto unobserv-
able reality in some critical, success-inducing respects. Why exactly should
the realist be furthermore required to offer a recipe that the Newtonians
could have in principle employed to reveal these success-inducing respects
in advance of further scientific developments due to Einstein and others?
For Stanford (2003a,b) it is critical that the realist provides a prospect-
9In a similar spirit Cordero (2011) appeals to the essential (explanatory) role of ‘ether’
in 19th c. wave theories of light.
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ively applicable recipe, for two interconnected reasons. First, he argues that
a retrospective identification of the ways in which a theory latches onto un-
observable reality trivialises the realist gambit, since it ‘virtually guarantees’
that those aspects of the earlier theory that are judged to be latching onto
unobservable reality (by virtue of being appropriately continuous with the
latest theory) can also be viewed as the aspects responsible for the theory’s
empirical success.10 Secondly, Stanford (2003b) appeals to what he calls
the ‘trust argument’: if the articulation of the realist’s epistemic commit-
ments implies that we cannot trust our current science in what it says about
the unobservable—in the sense that we cannot pin down some aspects in
which a theory is latching onto unobservable reality—then those epistemic
commitments are not worthy of the realist label.
Let’s start with the triviality challenge. It is true, of course, that our
current theories offer the only perspective available to us on those aspects
of past theories that can be deemed to have potentially latched onto un-
observable reality. In as far as we have reason to take a current theory to
be latching better onto unobservable reality than a past theory, the shared
aspects of the theories are the only ingredients available for a realist explan-
ation of the past theory’s empirical success. This much is undeniably true
of the realist’s epistemic predicament; to have it otherwise would require
a theory-independent access to the way the world is. But why think, as
Stanford does, that it is ‘virtually guaranteed’ that the shared aspects—
whatever they are—can be deemed to account for the past theory’s success
from a realist perspective? Why think that we cannot have a critical grasp
of the realist sense of ‘accounting for past successes’, so as to be able to
judge fairly whether or not the shared aspects genuinely do account for the
past successes in terms that satisfy the realist aspirations?
Stanford has no argument to show that such a critical grasp cannot be
had. What he points to, rather, are serious ambiguities in the realists’ char-
acterisations of what is doing the ‘accounting’. Admittedly realists have said
very little about what it takes for shared aspects to furnish a genuine realist
account of past successes, and in the face of this it is natural to worry, as
Stanford does, that realists end up fooling themselves by expecting every
kind of continuity to furnish a realist account of past empirical successes.
But such a worry is not an argument against the realist strategy per se; it
10See Stanford (2003a):
It is the very fact that some features of a past theory survive in our present
account of nature that leads the realist both to regard them as true and
to believe that they were the sources of the rejected theory’s success or
effectiveness. So the apparent convergence of truth and the sources of success
in past theories is easily explained by the simple fact that both kinds of
retrospective judgments about these matters have a common source in our
present beliefs about nature. (p. 914)
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does not show that the strategy of responding to historical ‘inductions’ by
retrospective identification of aspects of reality-latching is somehow intrins-
ically flawed. What Stanford has provided, rather, is an argument against
realists’ implementations of this strategy.
I think Stanford is right in objecting to some popular implementations of
the realist strategy. In particular, many realists have pretended to be able to
offer something like a general recipe for judging whether or not two theories
share aspects that furnish a realist account of the past theory’s empirical
success. Thus, structural realists, for instance, have appealed to a generic
notion of ‘structural correspondence’ to this effect, the thought being that
we can trust the ‘structural’ content our current theories’, while maintaining
an agnostic or even sceptical attitude towards the super-structural aspects
(e.g. the nature of the entities involved). A challenge to this kind of recipe-
realism is that all attempts to pin down a general recipe along these lines
have arguably resulted in a characterisation of realist commitments so vague
and ill-defined as to deflate the realist claim to be able to trust in our current
theories in the sense given by the recipe.11 For Stanford this challenge
is (part of) his ‘trust argument’: in presenting a recipe for stating their
epistemic commitment in a way that is compatible with various different
kinds of theory changes in the history of science the realist is forced to
‘defend realist inferential entitlements that are so weak as to capitulate to
the realist’s opponent on the question of whether we can safely trust the
accounts of nature given by current or future successful scientific theories’
(2003b, p. 572).
Stanford’s ‘trust argument’ has bite against the kind of recipe-realism
that endeavours to offer a generic recipe for delineating the trust-worthy
parts or aspects of our current theories. But if read as an argument against
realism in toto, it again embodies an undue presupposition about what real-
ism must amount to. Stanford operates with a particular conception of
scientific realism in mind: scientific realism defends our ability to ‘trust or
believe what our own best scientific theories tell us about what things are like
in otherwise inaccessible domains of the natural world.’ (2006, p. 158)12 Al-
though this way of construing realism is popular and has a venerable history,
there are more minimal ways of construing the scope of realist commitments.
One can defend a realist stance without the ambition of recipe-realism.
In particular, the realist can instead defend her trust in the reliability of
the scientific method in yielding theories that latch better and better onto
the unobservable reality; trust in the corresponding objective theoretical
progress of science; trust in the thesis that our best theories that make novel
11It is commonplace to state that structural realism is a matter of being committed to
our theories’ structural claims about the unobservable reality, or knowing the structure of
unobservable reality.
12Selective realism then amounts to providing a reliable recipe for picking out the ‘bits’
of our current theories that we can trust.
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predictions (by and large) do so by virtue of latching onto unobservable
reality. These alternative ways of expressing realist commitment have a
venerable history as well, and they need not collapse either to realism in
Stanford’s sense, or to the kind of neo-instrumentalism that Stanford proffers
as an alternative to realism.13 I will characterise a ‘minimal’ realism attitude
towards fundamental theories in this spirit, in terms of theoretical progress,
in the final section.14 Such realism is compatible with the historical record
of science, and it is not touched by Laudan’s argument by virtue of rejecting
some of the critical assumptions that this Old ‘induction’ presupposes.
2.3 New Induction
What about Stanford’s New Induction—does it add to the historical pressure
to give up realist aspirations altogether, in connection with ‘fundamental
theories’? (Stanford, 2006) The answer is no. To see why, let’s recall the
gist of the New induction and its target, to begin with.
(P1) Historical fact 1: Scientists often fail to consider all plaus-
ible explanations of some phenomenon (at least in the fun-
damental sciences).
(P2) Fact about the scientific method: Scientists often perform
eliminative inferences: they endorse or commit to a par-
ticular theory after having eliminated all but one of the
explanations they have managed to consider.
(P3) Historical fact 2: Scientists often, in the fullness of time,
come up with and adopt an alternative explanation that was
unconceived at the time of the earlier eliminative inference.
(C) Conclusion: The eliminative inferences in science are unre-
liable: they do not deliver trustworthy results, since they
do not take into account plausible, unconceived alternative
explanations.
This is clearly a new historical argument against realism. It puts an in-
teresting new spin on the Old induction by virtue of performing an induction
over scientists (as opposed to theories) in a more prescribed context of fun-
damental theorising employing eliminative inference. Due to these novelties
the argument can in some ways go beyond the Old induction in its argument-
ative resources; it is not merely a ‘novel red herring’ that works against the
realist only to the extent the Old induction already does (cf. Chakravartty
(2007) and Magnus (2010) for nice analyses).
13In Saatsi (in progress b) I characterise and challenge recipe-realism in more general
terms.
14In Saatsi (in progress a) I discuss minimal realism in more detail in the context of
epistemic conceptions of scientific progress.
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Nevertheless, realist responses to the Old induction substantially inter-
act with the New induction. One way to see this is to ask: what should we
make of the unreliability of eliminative inferences established by the New
induction (granting the premises)? What epistemic attitudes are available
towards fundamental theories arrived at by an eliminative inference? Is anti-
realism now in the offing, as Stanford proposes? Drawing a squarely anti-
realist conclusion again overshoots by extrapolating beyond the historical
evidence that supports (C). Given the moves that a realist may already feel
compelled to make in the face of the Old induction—namely, emphasising
novel predictive success, and adopting a piecemeal approach to exemplifying
the sense in which a realist can account for an old theory’s predictive suc-
cess from our current vantage point—it is not clear that the New induction
imposes any further threat on the realist.
The minimal realist position that I will outline in the next section, for
example, is compatible with the New induction’s conclusion that elimin-
ative inferences in fundamental science are unreliable with respect to the
purported explanatory mechanisms. Notwithstanding the New induction’s
conclusion, a realist can maintain that eliminative inferences are reliable in
the sense that the resulting novel predictive successes (if any) are due to
the theories suitably latching onto reality in ways that can be retrospect-
ively analysed from the perspective of even better theories. In the light of
the realist’s response to the Old induction the historical record that demon-
strates the recurring occurrence of unconceived alternatives gets interpreted
quite differently. For example, general relativity may be viewed as an un-
conceived alternative to special relativity, which in turn can be viewed as
an unconceived alternative to Newtonian mechanics, but for the realist the
subtle inter-theoretic relations between these theories can furnish a sense
in which the earlier theories nevertheless latched onto unobservable reality
in critical respects. Thus, the later theories can be viewed as alternatives
(as opposed to significant improvements) to the earlier theories only in a
somewhat curtailed sense that does not support a kind of transient under-
determination that should further trouble the realist. The premises of the
New induction, as presented above, conceal the critical inter-theoretic con-
nections that underlie the realist’s positive attitude towards the outcomes
of eliminative inferences in fundamental science. This gives the mislead-
ing impression that (C) should be automatically viewed as a thoroughgoing
anti-realist conclusion.
Stanford’s conception of realism is obviously not going to be fulfilled
by the realist moves that I have envisaged above as a way of sidestepping
both the Old and the New induction. As already indicated, Stanford op-
erates with a particular notion of realism in mind, characterising realism
as ‘the position that the central claims of our best scientific theories about
how things stand in nature must be at least probably and/or approximately
true.’ (2006, p. 6). The minimal realist attitude that I will presently de-
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lineate is a far cry from this kind of optimism, and one might even worry
that the disagreement becomes largely terminological: what I call (minimal)
realism, Stanford calls anti-realism? But recall the key question at stake:
how strongly does the history of science speak against realism? In attempt-
ing to answer this question as carefully as we can, it is better not to stick to
such a demanding conception of realism and use it as a foil in an argument
for a strong form of anti-realism in the ‘instrumentalist tradition’, according
to which ‘the fundamental theories [...] should be regarded [...] simply as
powerful conceptual tools for action and guides to further inquiry.’ (Stanford
2006, p. 24) For regardless of what we choose to call a position that results
by giving up the presuppositions required by Stanford’s argument, the New
induction is a non-sequitur as an argument for upholding the instrumentalist
tradition: there are more positive epistemic attitudes towards fundamental
science that directly tap into some central realist intuitions, and fall between
Stanford’s neo-instrumentalism and his demanding conception of realism.
3 Minimal realism
This paper is primarily about the limits of historical evidence in the realism
debate, analysed by questioning and weakening the presuppositions that
anti-realists have made about realism in their historical ‘inductions’. My
criticism regarding the overshooting of the anti-realist arguments already
stands, and I trust to have already established the possibility of escaping
these arguments without landing in empiricism or instrumentalism. We still
need to elaborate and provide a positive argument for a view that thus
escapes the tension with the historical record remains, however. To finish
the paper I will delineate a way of thinking about minimal realism in the
spirit of my remarks on historical inductions above.15
It is natural to understand scientific realism as being committed, at the
minimum, to the claim that science as a matter of fact makes theoretical pro-
gress in the sense that theories better supported by scientific evidence (by
and large) latch better onto unobservable reality. This way of understand-
ing realism is broader than a popular conception of realism—a conception
that Stanford also has in mind—in terms of theoretical knowledge of the
unobservable.16 If one thinks of theoretical progress in purely epistemic
terms—in terms of accumulation of theoretical knowledge (see e.g. Bird,
15See also Saatsi (in progress a) and Saatsi (in progress b) for related discussion.
16Cf. Chakravartty (2011):
Most commonly [realism] is described in terms of the epistemic achievements
constituted by scientific theories . . .What all of approaches [to defining real-
ism] have in common is a commitment to the idea that our best theories
have a certain epistemic status: they yield knowledge of aspects of the world,
including unobservable aspects. (p. 1, my emphasis)
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2006)—then commitment to theoretical progress of science more or less en-
tails the latter, popular conception of realism. But the epistemic conception
of theoretical progress is too narrow: science can make theoretical progress
that does not boil down to accumulation of knowledge. In particular, sci-
ence can make theoretical progress in the sense of theories latching better
and better onto reality in a way that drives theories’ increasing empirical
adequacy and enables them to make novel predictions. Corresponding to
this broader conception of theoretical progress there is a more minimal con-
ception of realism, understood simply as a commitment to this broader kind
of theoretical progress.
The broader conception of theoretical progress is characterised in terms
of theories ‘latching (better) onto unobservable reality’. I have also made
liberal use of the ‘latching onto’ locution throughout the paper. What does it
mean? I answer this question in more depth elsewhere (cf. Saatsi, in progress
b), but here is the gist of it. Take the commonplace notion that theories—
or theoretical representations, or models—can, in a given respect, provide
better or worse representations of reality. This provides an intuitive and
relatively unproblematic starting point. One way in which a theory T ′ can
be a better representation of reality than T , is with respect to observable
phenomena, by virtue of being more empirically adequate. This sense of
representational improvement in science is commonplace and acknowledged
by realists and anti-realists alike. But it can furthermore be the case that
the boost in empirical adequacy from T to T ′ is by virtue of T ′ being a better
representation of the unobservable features of the world that lie behind the
relevant empirical phenomena. If that is the case, then we can say that
T ′ latches better onto unobservable reality than T—that is, T ′ latches onto
unobservable reality in respects relevant to the improvement in empirical
adequacy. It is this sense of latching onto unobservable reality, this sense of
theoretical progress, that realists are minimally committed to.
What does it take for a theory to be a ‘better representation’ of the unob-
servable reality (so as to be responsible for increase in empirical adequacy)?
This sense of representational improvement is not a matter of ‘overall fit’
between a theoretical representation and (unobservable) reality—it is rather
a matter relative to the respective degrees of empirical adequacy: a ‘better’
representation is more veridical with respect to some aspects that matter
for improving empirical adequacy, i.e. a better representation is closer to
the way the world actually is in those respects. If we were equipped with
knowledge of the way the world actually is, we would be able to account for
the improvement in empirical adequacy in terms of objective features of the
representational relations between the two theories and the world, judging
the unobservable aspects of the world represented by T ′ to be closer to ac-
tuality, in the relevant respects, than those represented by T . Not knowing
the way the world is independently of our current theories, we can still use
these theories to account for our past theories’ empirical success in terms
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of rich inter-theoretic relations between the theories, and project confidence
that those realist accounts will not be undermined by future developments.
Clearly this kind of minimal realist commitment provides nothing like
a general recipe that could be applied to a given current theory—e.g. the
standard model of particle physics—to specify what unobservable features
of the world we can claim to know. But recipe-realism looks like a fool’s
errand, and should not be viewed as a sine qua non of vindication of realism.
According to minimal realism the best we can do (with respect to some fun-
damental theories) is to commit ourselves to general progress of science that
extends also to the theoretical level. Sometimes—for example in connection
with fundamental physics—theoretical progress is just a matter of theories
latching better and better onto unobservable reality so as to drive the em-
pirical and instrumental progress of science. Specific cases of inter-theoretic
relations can be studied to provide a fleshed out sense of the way in which
false past theories, such as Newtonian gravity, have latched onto reality so as
to satisfy the minimal realist’s creed that these false theories are predictively
successful (to the extent they are) by virtue of ‘getting something critical
right’ about the world. Such studies can then serve as particular, locally ap-
plicable exemplars of the rich ways in which we can retrospectively account
for our past theories’ empirical success, in the realist spirit, in terms of them
having latched onto reality. We can study such exemplars, comparing and
contrasting them, to get a satisfactory handle on retrospective accounting
of empirical success, but this will fall much sort of yielding a realist recipe
(cf. Saatsi, forthcoming a).
The locution ‘latching (better) onto reality’ is meant to pick out the
most general notion that taps into the ‘explanationist’ realist agenda. It is
purposefully characterised in very broad terms, so as to be compatible with
various forms of scientific realism that are all in the business of accounting (in
realist terms) for the empirical success of false past theories from our current
perspective. Different realists offer different, more precise definitions that
take a stand on exactly what kind of representational adequacy in a given
scientific case can account for a theory’s degree of empirical adequacy in a
way that satisfies the realist intuitions and doesn’t give the game away to
the anti-realist. The advocates of structural realism, for example, claim that
the empirical success of past theories can be accounted for in terms of these
theories providing a veridical representation of critical structural aspects of
reality.17 A related but subtly different position claims that the empirical
success of past theories is (sometimes) best accounted for in terms of these
theories providing a veridical representation of critical less specific properties
(Saatsi 2005). Both realist positions are committed to the claim that the
degree of empirical adequacy enjoyed by Fresnel’s optical ether theory can be
17There are various differences amongst the structural realists. For a review, see Frigg
and Votsis (2011)
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accounted for in terms of Fresnel’s theorising latching onto reality. Similarly,
the boost in empirical adequacy achieved by classical electrodynamics—
itself a false theory as a classical (non-quantum) theory—can arguably be
accounted for in terms of the theory latching better onto reality. These
different realist positions all claim that there is an unambiguous sense of
theoretical progress from Fresnel to Maxwell to Feynman; the disagreement
is mainly about how to best capture the specific sense in which these theories
are progressively latching onto reality. This progress is captured by minimal
realism in terms that are more general and independent of particular realist
preferences for precisifying the ‘latching onto’ notion in specific historical
cases.18
4 Conclusion
For several decades anti-realists have argued that the history of science
clearly speaks against realism. How can realists still remain unconvinced
by these arguments? Instead of being an indication of dogmatism, the per-
sistence of the disagreement can be at least partly explained by simply noting
that the strength of the historical evidence against realism depends on what
‘realism’ is taken to be. I have argued that the prominent historical argu-
ments against realism display a systematic overshooting in the conclusions
drawn from the historical evidence. Having first identified this trend in the
debate ensuing Laudan’s ‘Old induction’, it was easier to see how Stanford’s
New induction overshoots as well, by drawing a squarely anti-realist conclu-
sion from historical data that is compatible with a suitably modest realist
attitude towards ‘fundamental theories’.
In the abstract, the issue is just this. Anti-realists’ inductions presup-
pose that it is essential for realism to have certain features. Having argued
that realism-thus-construed is undermined in the face of the history of sci-
ence, anti-realists have concluded (or have been taken to conclude) with
empiricism, or instrumentalism about science. The problem is that the step
from realism-thus-construed to anti-realism is too large: there are inter-
mediate views, naturally viewed as exemplifying a key realist credo, that
fall between anti-realism and realism-thus-construed. Furthermore, since
these intermediate views are not undermined by the same historical record,
a historically-driven anti-realism owes us an argument for jumping all the
way to anti-realism.
18Minimal realism is also meant to be compatible with pluralism regarding different
philosophical, meta-scientific frameworks that can be used to capture ‘latching onto’ in
more specific terms. These include, for example, (i) the similarity approach (e.g. Giere
1988, Teller 2001); (ii) the partial isomorphism approach (e.g. da Costa and French 2003);
(iii) the mathematico-logical structure approach (Worrall 2007).
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